October 21, 2019

Interim Bankruptcy Rules Published for Public Comment

On February 19, 2020, the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, P.L. 116-54 (SBRA) will go into effect – long before the normal three-year rules amendment process runs its course. As a temporary measure, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules has drafted interim bankruptcy rules and amendments to the official bankruptcy forms to address the new law that are now available for public comment through Nov. 13, 2019.

The proposed amendments and instructions on how to submit comments are posted on uscourts.gov.

When an advisory committee recommends an amendment to its rules or forms, it must obtain the approval of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to publish the proposed amendment for public comment. During the comment period, the public is encouraged to submit written comments and may also request to testify at public hearings on the proposed amendment.

There are two rules packages out for review.

August 19 Package

On June 25, 2019, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee) approved publication of proposed amendments to the following:

  • Appellate Rules 3, 6, 42, and Forms 1 and 2;
  • Bankruptcy Rules 2005, 3007, 7007.1, and 9036; and
  • Civil Rule 7.1.

The comment period is open from August 19, 2019 to February 19, 2020. Read the text of the proposed amendments and supporting materials:

Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, and Civil Procedure (pdf)

Public Hearings on the August 19 Package

Members of the public who wish to present testimony may appear at public hearings on the proposed amendments.

How to Submit or Review Comments on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules & Forms (August 19 Package)

Written comments are welcome on each proposed amendment. The advisory committees will review all timely comments, which are made part of the official record and are available to the public. The comment period closes on February 19, 2020.

Comments and supporting files must be submitted electronically using the regulations.gov portal. After choosing the appropriate link below, click the “Submit a Comment” link. This will display the comment on the web form. You can then enter your submitter information and attach your comment as a file (up to 10MB), or type your comment directly on the web form. When you have finished attaching or typing your comment, click the “Preview Comment” link to review. Once you are satisfied with your comment, click the “Submit” button to send your comment to the relevant advisory committee. Upon completion, you will receive a tracking number for your submission.

Detailed instructions on how to submit a comment are given in the Regulations.gov FAQs.

October 16 Package

On February 19, 2020, the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, P.L. 116-54 (SBRA) will go into effect – long before the normal three-year rules amendment process runs its course. As a temporary measure, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules has drafted Interim Bankruptcy Rules that can be adopted by courts as local rules or by general order when the SBRA goes into effect. The Advisory Committee has also drafted amendments to the Official forms to address the SBRA. The Standing Committee now seeks comment on the proposed SBRA rules and forms for a short four-week period prior to making final recommendations.

  • Interim Bankruptcy Rules 1007(b), 1007(h), 1020, 2009, 2012(a), 2015, 3010(b), 3011, and 3016.
  • Official Forms 101, 201, 309E, 309F, 314, 315, 425A, and new Official Forms 309E2, and 309F2

The comment period is open from October 16, 2019 to November 13, 2019. Because of the short publication period for the Interim Rules and related Official Forms, there will be no public hearings.

Read the text of the proposed amendments and supporting materials:

Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure – Interim Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms (pdf)

How to Submit or Review Comments on the Interim Bankruptcy Rules & Forms (October 16 Package)

Written comments are welcome on each proposed amendment. The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules will review all timely comments, which are made part of the official record and are available to the public. The comment period closes on November 13, 2019.

Comments and supporting files must be submitted electronically using the regulations.gov portal. After choosing the appropriate link below, click the “Submit a Comment” link. This will display the comment on the web form. You can then enter your submitter information and attach your comment as a file (up to 10MB), or type your comment directly on the web form. When you have finished attaching or typing your comment, click the “Preview Comment” link to review. Once you are satisfied with your comment, click the “Submit” button to send your comment to the relevant advisory committee. Upon completion, you will receive a tracking number for your submission.

Detailed instructions on how to submit a comment are given in the Regulations.gov FAQs.

SOURCE

History of Labor Day

Labor Day 2019

On September 2, 2019, the U.S. Department of Labor celebrates and honors the greatest worker in the world – the American worker. Labor Day 2019 is the 125th anniversary of Labor Day being celebrated as a national holiday.

Labor Day: What it Means

Labor Day, the first Monday in September, is a creation of the labor movement and is dedicated to the social and economic achievements of American workers. It constitutes a yearly national tribute to the contributions workers have made to the strength, prosperity, and well-being of our country.

Labor Day Legislation

The first governmental recognition came through municipal ordinances passed in 1885 and 1886. From these, a movement developed to secure state legislation. The first state bill was introduced into the New York legislature, but the first to become law was passed by Oregon on February 21, 1887. During 1887, four more states – Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York – created the Labor Day holiday by legislative enactment. By the end of the decade Connecticut, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania had followed suit. By 1894, 23 more states had adopted the holiday, and on June 28, 1894, Congress passed an act making the first Monday in September of each year a legal holiday in the District of Columbia and the territories.

Founder of Labor Day

More than a century after the first Labor Day observance, there is still some doubt as to who first proposed the holiday for workers.

Some records show that Peter J. McGuire, general secretary of the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and a co-founder of the American Federation of Labor, was first in suggesting a day to honor those “who from rude nature have delved and carved all the grandeur we behold.”

But Peter McGuire’s place in Labor Day history has not gone unchallenged. Many believe that Matthew Maguire, a machinist, not Peter McGuire, founded the holiday. Recent research seems to support the contention that Matthew Maguire, later the secretary of Local 344 of the International Association of Machinists in Paterson, N.J., proposed the holiday in 1882 while serving as secretary of the Central Labor Union in New York. What is clear is that the Central Labor Union adopted a Labor Day proposal and appointed a committee to plan a demonstration and picnic.

The First Labor Day

The first Labor Day holiday was celebrated on Tuesday, September 5, 1882, in New York City, in accordance with the plans of the Central Labor Union. The Central Labor Union held its second Labor Day holiday just a year later, on September 5, 1883.

By 1894, 23 more states had adopted the holiday, and on June 28, 1894, President Grover Cleveland signed a law making the first Monday in September of each year a national holiday.

A Nationwide Holiday

Women's Auxiliary Typographical Union

The form that the observance and celebration of Labor Day should take was outlined in the first proposal of the holiday — a street parade to exhibit to the public “the strength and esprit de corps of the trade and labor organizations” of the community, followed by a festival for the recreation and amusement of the workers and their families. This became the pattern for the celebrations of Labor Day. Speeches by prominent men and women were introduced later, as more emphasis was placed upon the economic and civic significance of the holiday. Still later, by a resolution of the American Federation of Labor convention of 1909, the Sunday preceding Labor Day was adopted as Labor Sunday and dedicated to the spiritual and educational aspects of the labor movement.

The character of the Labor Day celebration has changed in recent years, especially in large industrial centers where mass displays and huge parades have proved a problem. This change, however, is more a shift in emphasis and medium of expression. Labor Day addresses by leading union officials, industrialists, educators, clerics, and government officials are given wide coverage in newspapers, radio, and television.

The vital force of labor added materially to the highest standard of living and the greatest production the world has ever known and has brought us closer to the realization of our traditional ideals of economic and political democracy. It is appropriate, therefore, that the nation pays tribute on Labor Day to the creator of so much of the nation’s strength, freedom, and leadership – the American worker.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor

We are always here for you. Even on holidays. Contact us any time 24/7/365: CONTACT

New Case Law Regarding Acceleration

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,TRUSTEE v.JOSEPH R. PONGER ET AL.(AC 41014) DiPentima, C. J., and Moll and Sullivan, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant T and her former spouse, P. T and P had executed a mortgage deed, and P had executed a note in favor of a predecessor in interest of the plaintiff. The note was later assigned to the plaintiff. After P failed to make payments pursuant to the note, the plaintiff advised him that the note and mortgage were in default, and mailed notice of the default addressed to him, but not to T, at the address of the property at issue, at which P no longer lived at the time that the plaintiff mailed the notice to him there. In the absence of a cure of the default, the plaintiff thereafter elected to accelerate the amount due under the note. T claimed that the plaintiff had failed to provide herewith proper notice of the default and acceleration of the note when it sent notice to the property that was addressed to P. The trial court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure for the plaintiff, concluding,inter alia, that the notice of default and acceleration was sent to T as a joint tenant of the mortgaged property and a joint obligor on the mortgage deed. On T’s appeal to this court,held that the trial court properly rendered judgment of strict foreclosure for the plaintiff, as that court correctly concluded that the notice requirement under the mortgage was satisfied because notice to one joint tenant or joint obligor constitutes notice to the other; because T conceded that, at all relevant times, she and P were joint tenants with respect to the subject property,it was not in dispute that T and P continued as joint obligors under the mortgage, and T did not dispute that her signature was on the mortgage,notice to P constituted notice to T.Argued November 29, 2018—officially released July 2, 2019Procedural History Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property of the named defendant et al., and for other relief,brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court,Mintz, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability as against the named defendant; thereafter, the court,Hon. A. William Mottolese, judge trial referee,accepted the parties’ stipulation of facts, and the matter was tried to the court,Hon. A. William Mottolese, judge trial referee; judgment of strict foreclosure, from which the defendant Theresa Ponger appealed to this court.Affirmed.Colin B. Connor, for the appellant (defendant Theresa Ponger). Christopher J. Picard, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

SULLIVAN, J. The defendant Theresa Ponger appeals from a judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by thetrial court.1On appeal, the defendant’s principal claim isthat the court erred when it concluded that the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, in Trust, for Registered Holders of Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL3, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series2006-WL3, had provided notice of default and acceleration to her when it sent notice to the subject property addressed to her former spouse, Joseph R. Pongern (Ponger), who no longer resided at the property.Because the court correctly held that the notice requirement under the mortgage was satisfied because notice to one joint tenant or joint obligor constitutes noticeto the others, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.The parties stipulated to the following relevant facts.On September 7, 2005, Ponger executed a note in favor of Long Beach Mortgage Company in the principalamount of $420,000. The note was endorsed in blankand supplied to the plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action. Also on September 7, 2005, Ponger andthe defendant executed a mortgage deed in favor ofLong Beach Mortgage Company on property located at23 Macintosh Road, Norwalk. The mortgage was recorded in the Norwalk land records on September13, 2005.2The plaintiff is the present holder of the note.On or about December 6, 2013, by letter addressed to Ponger at 23 Macintosh Road, Norwalk, Connecticut06857, the plaintiff advised him that the note and mort-gage were in default due to his failure to make therequired monthly payments.3Notice of the aforemen-tioned default was not addressed to the defendant.4Inthe absence of a cure of the default, the plaintiff electedto accelerate the amount due under the note. On April15, 2014, the plaintiff provided Ponger and the defen-dant notice of their rights under the General Statutes as they relate to the Emergency Mortgage AssistanceProgram. See General Statutes § 8-265cc et seq. Therecord further indicates that Ponger failed to make pay-ments pursuant to the note from July 1, 2013, to thedate of the joint stipulation, May 9, 2017.The present action was commenced on October 13,2015, approximately eighteen months after the Emer-gency Mortgage Assistance Program notice was mailedto the subject property. On May 5, 2016, after the expira-tion of the court approved foreclosure mediation period, the defendant filed a timely answer asserting,as a special defense, that the plaintiff had failed toprovide her with proper notice of default and accelera-tion. Thereafter, on June 2, 2016, the plaintiff filed amotion for summary judgment as to both Ponger and the defendant. The court granted the motion with respect to Ponger but denied the motion with respect to the defendant. On May 16, 2017, the parties filed a joint stipulation of facts with the court as to the remaining issues in dispute. On September 6, 2017, the court issued its memorandum of decision finding in favor of the plaintiff. The court determined that ‘‘[r]esolution of this issue is controlled squarely byCiticorp Mortgage,Inc.v.Porto, 41 Conn. App. 598, 600–604, 677 A.2d 10(1996),’’5and, thus, concluded in relevant part that the‘‘notice of default and acceleration was sent to [the defendant] as a joint tenant of the mortgaged property and a joint obligor on the mortgage deed.’’ Thereafter,the court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure against both Ponger and the defendant, and set thelaw day for January 16, 2018. This appeal followed.Additional facts and procedural history will be set forthas necessary.The defendant’s principal claim on appeal is that the court erred when it concluded that the notice require-ment provision of the subject mortgage had been satis-fied as to the defendant when the plaintiff provided notice addressed exclusively to Ponger.6Specifically,the defendant claims that, because she is a ‘‘[b]orrower’’under the terms of the mortgage, and because the noticeprovision of the mortgage requires notice of defaultand acceleration to be given to the ‘‘[b]orrower,’’ the plaintiff was required to provide her individually withnotice. The defendant further claims that the courtimproperly applied the legal principles set forth inCiti-corp Mortgage, Inc. v.Porto, supra, 41 Conn. App. 600,because the present case is distinguishable, and, as aresult of the improper application ofCiticorp Mortgage,Inc., a necessary condition precedent to the foreclosure action was not met.7We disagree.As an initial matter, we note that the defendant’sclaim presents a mixed question of law and fact. ‘‘Wherethe question whether proper notice was given depends upon the construction of a written instrument or the circumstances are such as lead to only one reasonable conclusion, it will be one of law, but where the conclu-sion involves the effect of various circumstances capa-ble of diverse interpretation, it is necessarily one offact for the trier.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Sunset Mortgagev.Agolio, 109 Conn. App. 198, 202,952 A.2d 65 (2008). Because the plaintiff claims ‘‘thatthe facts found were insufficient to support the court’slegal conclusion, this issue presents a mixed question of law and fact to which we apply plenary review.’’Winchesterv.McCue, 91 Conn. App. 721, 726, 882 A.2d143, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 922, 888 A.2d 91 (2005).We begin by addressing the defendant’s claim thatthe court erred when it applied the legal principles setforth inCiticorp Mortgage, Inc., to the present case. InCiticorp Mortgage, Inc., this court addressed whether notice to one joint tenant constituted notice to the oth-ers under similar, but not identical, circumstances.

There, the defendant and his spouse were living apart,and neither the defendant nor the spouse resided at the subject property at the time notice was delivered.Similar to the notice provision in the present case, the relevant notice provision provided: ‘‘Unless applicable law requires a different method, any notice that must be given to me under this note will be given by deliveringit or by mailing it first class to me at the property address above or at a different address if I give thenote holder notice of my different address.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.)Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v.Porto, supra, 41 Conn. App. 600 n.4. Unlike like thepresent case, in which the defendant is a signatoryonly on the subject mortgage, the defendant inCiticorpMortgage, Inc., was both a signatory on the note anda signatory on the corresponding mortgage.This court concluded that, although ‘‘proper noticeof acceleration is a necessary condition precedent toan action for foreclosure . . . the plaintiff provided thedefendant with proper notice by mailing the notice ofacceleration to [a joint tenant of the defendant].’’ Id.,603. This court further concluded that, ‘‘[w]hile itappears that service of a notice upon one tenant incommon is not usually regarded as binding upon theothers, unless they are engaged in a common enterprise,the rule is different where the relation is that of a joint tenancy. In such a case, it is said that notice to one ofthem is binding upon all. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Cotenancyand Joint Ownership § 113 (1995).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v.Porto, supra,41 Conn. App. 603.Largely informed by our Supreme Court’s decisioninKatzv.West Hartford, 191 Conn. 594, 600, 469 A.2d410 (1983), which reaffirmed long-standing precedent that ‘‘[i]n the case of cofiduciaries [and joint tenants]notice to one is deemed to be notice to the other,’’this court’s decision inCiticorp Mortgage, Inc., alsorestated the long-standing principle that ‘‘[n]otice toone of twojoint obligorsconveys notice to the otherwith respect to matters affecting the joint obligation.United Statesv. Fleisher Engineering & ConstructionCo., 107 F.2d 925, 929 (2d Cir. 1939).’’ (Emphasis added.)Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Porto, supra, 41 Conn. App.603–604. Despite the foregoing, the defendant claimsthat the trial court misapplied the aforementioned stan-dards because, unlike the defendant inCiticorp Mort-gage, Inc., who was both a signatory on the note and corresponding mortgage, she was not a signatory onthe subject note. We find the defendant’s claim unper-suasive.In a recent decision, this court addressed a similarclaim. SeeCitibank, N.A. v. Stein, 186 Conn. App. 224,199 A.3d 57 (2018), cert. denied, 331 Conn. 903, 202A.3d 373 (2019).8InCitibank, N.A., the defendant argued that, because he was a signatory on the subject mortgage but not a signatory on the corresponding note,notice to his former spouse, who was the sole signatory on the note, was not effective as to him. Id., 250 n.21.This court held that, because the defendant signed the mortgage instrument, thereby pledging the property as security for the debt obligation created by the note,which was signed by the former spouse, the defendantwas a joint obligor as to the mortgage and that the notice provided to his former spouse, despite their contrasting endorsements, satisfied the notice requirements under the mortgage. Id., 249–50, 250 n.21.Critically, at oral argument before this court, the defendant conceded that, at all relevant times, she andPonger were joint tenants with respect to the subjectproperty. 9SeeKatzv. West Hartford, supra, 191 Conn.600. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the defendant and Ponger continued as joint obligors under the sub-ject mortgage. SeevCiticorp Mortgage, Inc. v.Porto,supra, 41 Conn. App. 603–604. Further still, the defen-dant has not challenged the stipulation or otherwise disputed that her signature is on the mortgage. Accord-ingly, we conclude that the present case falls squarely within the ambit of this court’s decision inCiticorpMortgage, Inc., and, therefore,the notice to Pongerconstituted notice to the defendant.The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting new law days.In this opinion the other judges concurred.1Joseph R. Ponger was also a defendant at trial but does not appeal fromthe judgment of strict foreclosure. In this opinion, we refer to Theresa Pongeras the defendant and to Joseph R. Ponger as Ponger. Several encumbrances also were named as defendants, but they are not parties to this appeal.2By virtue of assignments of the mortgage from Long Beach Mortgage Company to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Trust 2006-WL3, dated April 7, 2010, and recorded June 11,2010, in volume 7200 at page 113 of the Norwalk land records, and thereafter from Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Trust 2006-WL3 to the plaintiff, dated August 20, 2015, and recordedOctober 9, 2015, in volume 8244 at page 101 of the Norwalk land records,the plaintiff became the mortgagee of record.3The notice provision of the subject mortgage provides in relevant part:‘‘Any notice to Borrower provided for in this Security Instrument shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail unless applicablelaw requires use of another method. The notice shall be directed to the Property Address or any other address Borrower designates by notice toLender.’’ The subject mortgage defines the ‘‘[b]orrower’’ as ‘‘Joseph Pongerand Theresa Ponger.’’4Relatedly, the defendant claims that the court erred when it concluded that the plaintiff’s admission that notice was not individually addressed tothe defendant did not preclude judgment of strict foreclosure. Because the plaintiffs admission is not legally significant as to the defendant’s claim onappeal, we decline to address it.5The principal issue before the trial court essentially was identical to the issue now presented on appeal, namely, whether the plaintiff was required to provide the defendant with individual notice of default and acceleration pursuant to the notice provision in the subject mortgage.6In addition, the defendant claims that, even assuming arguendo that she received the notice sent by the plaintiff to Ponger, the notice failed to comply with certain requirements set forth in the mortgage deed and, thus, was deficient. The defendant failed to raise this distinct claim before the trial court and, therefore, we decline to review it. See DiMiceliv.Cheshire, 162

Conn. App. 216, 229–30, 131 A.3d 771 (2016) (‘‘Our appellate courts, as a general practice, will not review claims made for the first time on appeal.We repeatedly have held that [a] party cannot present a case to the trial court on one theory and then seek appellate relief on a different one . . . .[A]n appellate court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is not distinctly raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause our review is limited to matters in the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided by the trial court.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).7Additionally, in her brief the defendant argues that the court erred when it concluded that she and Ponger were joint tenants as to the subject prop-erty. At oral argument, however, the defendant conceded that, at all relevant times, she remained a joint tenant to the subject property.8Citibank, N.A. v. Stein, supra, 186 Conn. App. 224, was officially released two days prior to oral argument. We note that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant chose to submit invited post argument memoranda to address its relevancy. See Practice Book § 67-10.9See footnote 7 of this opinion.

FAQ: Connecticut Foreclosure Mediation Program

“The Foreclosure Mediation Program was established pursuant to P.A. 08-176 and its purpose is to assist homeowners and lenders achieve a mutually agreeable resolution to a mortgage foreclosure action through the mediation process.”

-Connecticut Judicial Branch

1. What is the Foreclosure Mediation Program?
The Foreclosure Mediation Program was created in 2008 in response to the record number of foreclosure cases filed in our courts. In foreclosure mediation, a neutral third party (mediator) helps the homeowner and bank try to reach a fair, voluntary, and negotiated agreement. During mediation, the homeowner will meet with a mediator and a representative of the bank to try to reach an agreement.

2. Who are the mediators?
Foreclosure mediation specialists are Judicial Branch employees who are trained in mediation and foreclosure law. They have knowledge of different community-based resources and mortgage assistance programs that may be able to help homeowners. Most of the mediators are lawyers with many years of mediation experience. Mediators do not represent either party and cannot give legal advice.

3. How do I know if I am eligible for foreclosure mediation?
You are eligible if (a) you are the borrower (the person who signed the note secured by a mortgage on the property), (b) you are an owner-occupant of the property, (c) the property is your primary residence, (d) the property is a 1, 2, 3 or 4 family residence in Connecticut, and (e) your case is a mortgage foreclosure with a return date on or after July 1, 2008. If you are not a borrower, but you meet all other requirements for eligibility, you may be able to participate in the program if you are a permitted successor-in-interest. You are a permitted successor-in-interest if (1) you are a defendant in the foreclosure action, (2) the foreclosure action has a return date on or after October 1,2015, and (3) you are either (a) the spouse of a deceased borrower, and you became the only owner of the property because it was transferred to you from your spouse’s estate or because of the way you held title to the property with your deceased spouse; or (b) the spouse or former spouse of a borrower, and (i) you became an owner of the property because it was transferred to you as a result of a decree of divorce or legal separation, or a settlement agreement that was a part of either decree and (ii) you and all borrowers have consented to the release of nonpublic personal financial information by the plaintiff/mortgagee, if any, that is in its possession.

Certain religious organizations may also be eligible for the program.

Homeowners who do not meet these requirements could be referred to the Foreclosure Mediation Program by a judge.

SOURCE: The Connecticut Judicial Branch Website

IF YOU HAVE MORE QUESTIONS:

Please contact Attorney Theresa Rose DeGray here for immediate assistance or text “HELP” to 203-814-0600.

Frequently Asked Connecticut Bankruptcy Law Questions

Attorney Theresa Rose DeGray

Q: What is bankruptcy?

A: Bankruptcy is a legal process for people who cannot afford to pay their bills, and offers them a fresh start. The right to file for bankruptcy is granted by federal law, and all Connecticut bankruptcy cases are handled in federal courts located in New Haven, Bridgeport and Hartford.

Q: How can Bankruptcy help me?

A: Bankruptcy can eliminate unsecured debt, end collection harassment, stop foreclosures, prevent repossessions, stop wage garnishments and bank executions, and/or restore utility service.

Q: How often can I file bankruptcy?
A: You can file for a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy every eight (8) years. Chapter 13 Bankruptcies can be filed every six (6) years.

Q: What is the difference between a consumer bankruptcy and a corporate bankruptcy?

A: A consumer bankruptcy is for individuals or married couples that have personal, and not business, debt. A corporate bankruptcy is for a corporation, or non-human entity.

Q: What is the difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13?

A: A Chapter 7 results in a total discharge of most unsecured debt. A Chapter 13 is a repayment plan. Please see our Laws Page for an extended discussion on this topic.

Q: What does it cost to file for Bankruptcy?
A: We charge a fee for our services which will be quoted at our initial consultation. In addition to our fee for services, the bankruptcy court also charges filing fees.

Q: How can I pay for my Bankruptcy?

A: We offer affordable payment plans and accept all forms of payment, including cash, check, and debit cards from the person filing for bankruptcy. If a non-filer wishes to pay for our fees for their family member or friend, we will accept a credit card from that person. We honor MasterCard, Visa, Discover and American Express.

Q: What property can I keep?

A: You may keep all “exempt” property like your home, car, wedding rings, home furnishings, etc. All property that is not exempt is subject to liquidation and the resulting monies used to pay back your creditors. Do Not Be Alarmed: we strive to maximize your exemptions and protect all of your property.

Q: Will bankruptcy wipe out all my debts?

A: Yes, both Chapter 7 and 13 are designed to give you a fresh start with a clean slate.

Q: What is a discharge?

A: A discharge is a court order that says you do not have to repay your debts, but there are some exceptions, such as child support.

Q: Will I have to go to court?
A: Yes, in a Chapter 7 case, you will have to attend a proceeding once which is like a “court hearing,” although, it is very informal and presided over by a trustee and not a judge. A Chapter 13 case may require more than one court appearance, usually two or three.

Q: Will bankruptcy affect my credit?

A: Yes, but there are easy ways to rebuild your credit in a relatively short period of time following your final discharge.

Q: Will I be able to keep any credit cards?

A: No, you will have to fully disclose all of your debts and accounts, which will be closed and discharged. Bankruptcy is an all or nothing process. Full disclosure of your assets and liabilities is required and subject to penalties of perjury.

Q: Can I keep and use my debit card?

A: Yes, a debit card is not a credit card.

Q: Can I get a credit card after bankruptcy?

A: Yes, and you will be counseled on how and when to apply, and which type of card works best to rehabilitate your credit.

Q: Are utility services affected?
A: Current services will not be affected if the account is current or near current. Requests for new services after a bankruptcy may result in the utility company requiring a deposit.

Q: Can I be discriminated against for filing bankruptcy?

A: Absolutely not. Filing bankruptcy is a right given and protected by Federal Law.

Q: I am married, can I file by myself?

A: Yes, you may file as a married individual.

Q: If I am married and I file individually, will my spouse’s credit be affected?
A: No, your spouse’s credit will not be affected if he or she does not file.

Q: Can filing bankruptcy stop bill collectors from calling?
A: Yes, they will be prohibited from harassing you.

Q: Can I discharge my student loans by filing bankruptcy?

A: Generally student loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. There are a few exceptions to this general rule.

This firm is a debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief amongst other things, under the Bankruptcy Code.

Divorce with Agreement (“Waive 90”)

If you and your spouse have an agreement as to all issues, you may ask the court to waive the 90-day waiting period that is otherwise required for divorces.

Note: This information also applies to dissolution of civil unions performed in a foreign jurisdiction.

What are the benefits of requesting that the 90-day waiting period be waived?

  • You can obtain a divorce as soon as you wish, subject to the court’s availability, as compared to the regular process, which takes at least 3 months.
  • You can move on with your life more quickly.

REPOSTED FROM: The Connecticut Judicial Website

For more information, contact Attorney Theresa Rose DeGray at 203-713-8877.

Role of the [Connecticut] Courts

Maintaining Order – The judicial system in Connecticut exists to uphold the laws of the state. Our courts help to maintain order in our society by:

  • determining the guilt or innocence of persons accused of breaking the law;
  • resolving disputes involving civil or personal rights;
  • interpreting constitutional provisions of laws enacted by the legislature and deciding what is to be the law of the state when none exists for certain situations. The court decision then becomes a precedent to be applied in like situations unless later overruled or modified by the Supreme Court or the General Assembly; and,
  • determining whether a law violates the Constitution of either the State of Connecticut or the United States.

Separation of Powers – Under our constitution, the courts are one of three branches of government:

  • The Legislative Branch (the Senate and House of Representatives) is responsible for creating new laws.
  • The Executive Branch (the Governor and executive branch agencies) is responsible for enforcing them.
  • The Judicial Branch (the courts) is responsible for interpreting and upholding our laws.

Relationship of Connecticut Courts to Federal Courts
In Connecticut, as throughout the United States, there are two judicial systems. One is the state system, established under the authority of the state constitution; the other is the federal system, established under the United States Constitution. Connecticut courts are courts of general jurisdiction. These courts handle most criminal matters and a variety of civil matters, including contracts, personal injury cases, dissolution of marriage and other legal controversies. In some instances, decisions of state courts may be appealed to the United States Supreme Court if a question of federal constitutional law arises.

Federal courts have jurisdiction over matters involving federal law, and over the following matters: cases brought by the United States, cases between two states or the citizens of two different states, cases between a state and a foreign state or its citizens, admiralty and maritime cases, and cases affecting ambassadors and other diplomatic personnel.

(Reposted from the Connecticut Judicial Branch Website)

Organization of the Courts [In Connecticut]: Probate Court

In addition to the state-operated courts, Connecticut has probate courts, which have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons, testamentary trusts, adoptions, conservators, commitment of the mentally ill, guardians of the persons, and estates of minors.

Each Probate Court has one judge, who is elected to a four-year term by the electors of the probate district. There are 54 Probate Court districts and six Regional Children’s Probate Courts. State law requires that probate judges be attorneys, and they are paid through a statutory formula. Probate Courts are housed in municipal facilities, most often town and city halls.

(Reposted from the Connecticut Judicial Branch Website)

Organization of the Courts [In Connecticut]: Superior Court

The Superior Court hears all legal controversies except those over which the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Probate Court matters may be appealed to the Superior Court.

A superior court courtroom The state is divided into 13 judicial districts, 20 geographical areas and 12 juvenile districts. In general, major criminal cases, civil matters and family cases not involving juveniles are heard at judicial district court locations. Other civil and criminal matters are heard at geographical area locations. Cases involving juveniles are heard at juvenile court locations.

The Superior Court has four principal trial divisions: civil, criminal, family and housing.

Civil Division – A civil case is usually a matter in which one party sues another to protect civil, personal or property rights. Examples of typical civil cases include landlord-tenant disputes, automobile or personal accidents, product or professional liability suits and contract disputes. In most civil cases, the accusing party (plaintiff) seeks to recover money damages from another party (defendant). Cases may be decided by the judge or by a jury, depending on the nature of the claim and the preference of the parties.

Criminal Division – A criminal case is one in which a person (defendant) is accused of breaking the law. The two sides in a criminal case are the state, represented by a state’s attorney (because crimes are considered acts that violate the rights of the entire state), and the defendant. Crimes (felonies and misdemeanors), violations and infractions are heard in the Criminal Division.

Housing Division – Cases involving housing are heard in special housing sessions in the Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, Stamford-Norwalk and Waterbury judicial districts. In all other judicial districts, these cases are part of the regular civil docket.

Family Division – The Family Division is responsible for the just and timely resolution of family relations matters and juvenile matters. Examples of family relations matters include: dissolution of marriage, child custody, relief from abuse and family support payments. Juvenile matters include: delinquency, child abuse and neglect, and termination of parental rights.

(Reposted from the Connecticut Judicial Branch Website)

New Bankruptcy Form, Rules Take Effect

Individuals filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 must use a new form that presents their payment plan in a more uniform and transparent manner, and creditors will have less time to submit a proof of claim, under new bankruptcy rules and form amendments that took effect Dec. 1.

By creating greater uniformity of where specific types of information must be entered, the new national Chapter 13 plan form will make it easier for creditors, lawyers and judges to ensure that all elements of a bankruptcy agreement reached under Chapter 13 comply with federal laws. Chapter 13, sometimes known as the wage earner’s plan, enables qualified individual filers to reschedule and make debt payments, allowing them to keep their homes and other property.

Bankruptcy courts previously had relied on local versions of Chapter 13 plans, which varied from district to district, in resolving Chapter 13 cases. They now must either use a new national Bankruptcy Form 113, or create a locally adapted form that contains key elements of the national form. In recent months, courts have been updating electronic filing systems and notifying local bankruptcy lawyers and filers of the pending changes.

The deadline for creditors to file a proof of claim was revised in an amendment to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002.

The new deadline will affect bankruptcies filed under Chapter 7, in which debtors liquidate assets; Chapter 12, which enables family farmers and fishermen to restructure their finances; and Chapter 13. Previously creditors had 90 days after an initial meeting of creditors was held. Now, a proof of claim must be submitted within 70 days of the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

Federal rules amendments typically follow a three-year process, which includes multiple layers of review and extensive public comment.

In April, the Supreme Court transmitted the new rules regarding bankruptcy, as well as amendments to Appellate and Civil Rules of Procedure, and Rules of Evidence, to Congress. The new rules took effect Dec. 1 when Congress did not act to prevent their implementation.

Find a full list of the new rules and form amendments and the Current Rules of Practice and Procedure. Find additional information about the bankruptcy process.

(Re-posted from http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/12/01/new-bankruptcy-form-rules-take-effect)

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